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TAGS: [ETTC](#) [IR](#) [KSCA](#) [MTCRE](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [SY](#)
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN RESPONSE ON UAVS TO SYRIA AND
NANOTECHNOLOGY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN

REF: A. STATE 27529 B. STATE 19780 C. MOSCOW 1005 D.
MOSCOW 851

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells.
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (S) Russian MFA Office of Disarmament and Security Affairs (DVBR) passed us a non-paper September 12 (faxed to EUR/RUS, informal translation in paragraph 3) in response to ref a and b demarches on the possible sale of UAVs to Syria and nanotechnology cooperation with Iran. DVBR officer Alexander Deyneko stressed that the possible sale of the Danem UAV to Syria (refs a and c) did not fall under category 2 of the Missile Technology Control Regime and was not prohibited under Russian law, as it was designed solely for environmental purposes. However, Syria had never responded to the Russian presentation and thus no sale was envisioned.

¶2. (S) With respect to possible Russian vaccine production assistance to Syria and nanotechnology assistance to Iran (refs b and d), Deyneko reported that the Semyonov Institute for Chemical Physics had signed a cooperation agreement with the Teheran University of Medical Sciences and exchanged information on the development of cardiology medicine, but that no transfer of equipment or nanotechnology had occurred or was planned. He also noted that the GOR did not consider such cooperation to be subject to the arms and export control regimes.

¶3. (C) Begin Russian non-paper:

Taking into account that non-proliferation issues are of high priority for the Russian side, and in view of the importance of maintaining and furthering partnership relations with the USA in this sphere, we have thoroughly studied reports that came from the U.S. about the dual-purpose products, either exported from Russia or intended for export, which, according to the U.S., may be used for the development of mass destruction weapons or means of their delivery. We have already checked some of the above reports while other reports are still being checked.

We would like to underline that any export from Russia is carried out in accordance with national law on export control, which ensures compliance with the international obligations of this country.

With regard to the subject matter of your questions we can inform as follows:

¶1. On the possibility of supplies to Syria of Russian produced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).

In 2006, the Russian Experimental Design Office Sokol conducted for the Syrian side a presentation of an UAV DanEM, produced for environmental monitoring. It should be noted that the UAV DanEM does not pertain to the products of

military designation and, therefore, it cannot fall under the criteria of Technical Supplement to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Russian Control List. The Syrian side did not submit any proposals for buying the UAV DanEM.

Also, we would like to note that the expressed concern of the U.S. side in this respect runs counter to the U.S. general policy in the MTCR directed at reducing control over unmanned aerial vehicles.

12. On cooperation with Iran in the sphere of nanobiotechnology.

In December 2005, the Semyonov Institute for Chemical Physics and the Scientific Center of Teheran University of Medical Sciences signed a protocol of cooperation. Dmitriy Kuznetsov, representative of the Institute, is actually a contact person for cooperation with Iran.

Within the frame of this cooperation, the sides have conducted consultations and exchange of experience in development of medicine for cardiology. No transfer of equipment or nanotechnology is envisaged by the above protocol.

We would like to note that this type of cooperation does not fall under the requirements of multilateral export control regimes, or the List of the Australia Group, and does not pertain to any proliferation danger. All the materials of cooperation with the Iranian side are usually published in open sources. However, as nanotechnology belongs to a high-tech sphere of scientific exploration, it has been subject to strict state control.

Burns